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SIOIISH IHTSRVKNTIOH T T! THE flORTHERH m \R 1657-1660.
CHAPTER 1.
TSNOTT ST! TNTSRVRNTIOli T TI THE F TRST DAFTISH TVAR.
The abdication of "ueen Christina in 1654 called to the
Swedish throne a no mean representative of the house of v"asa.
Charles X, Christina's successor, was the grandson of Charles IX
and grandsire of Charles XTT and the lustre of his meteoric career
was in no wise diminished by comparison with that of his great
progenitor, Custavus '.dolphus. He was the son of John Casimir,
Count palatineof "weibrucken and Catherine, sister of Gustavus
'.dolphus. Ee was therefore on his father's side a descendant
of the house of flttleshach. He was born at Nykbpping Castle on
the 8th day of ! Tov^nher, 1622. In his youth he had travelled
very extensively, his peregrinations carrying him to France, Ger-
many, Holland, and Denmark. At Paris he saw Richelieu at the
height of his power -md alBO attended the festivities connected
with the birth of the "Grande Tlonar chque" . The invincible Tor-
tensson was his teacher of strategy and the art of war while Cxen-
stierna guided him in his mastery of the art of diplomacy. Ee
stayed in Germany three and one-half years with the Swedish army,
in 1648 being appointed generalissimo of the Swedish forces. At
the executive conference at Nuremberg he had an excellent oppor-
tunity to master the details of diplomacy, and in his later career
he exhibited the thoroughness of Oxonstierna ' s tutelage. At one
time there was a movement on foot for him to marry the Amazonian
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Christina but she, like Queen Elizabeth, preferred a state of
single blessedness to narital bliss. Charles later married
Hedwig T,eonora, daughter of Frederick III, duke of Folstein-
Cottorp, thus paving a way for a future alliance against the
kingdoW of Denmark. (1)
Ascending to the Swedish throne at the age o:r thirty-two,
Charles X broiight with him such necessary qualities as exper-
ience, piet?', modesty, and firmness of will. It was as a soldier,
however, that he was to win his greatest fame and the energy of
the rest of his life was dissipated in a militancy which he deemed
necessary to bring popularity to himself and power to the Crown.
T ; j s is not a tacit admission that Charles was not successful in
the administration of the multiplicity of duties connected with
home affairs or in the minutiae of diplomacy for he displayed
eminent qualities o' being able to manage both. His own predilec-
tions and aims, however, seemed to make military glory paramount
to internal well-being and security and in this respec* he was
presecutinr the militant ideals of hie predecessors who regarded
war as Sweden's "most lucrative in'ustry".
Other considerations prompted Charles X to embark on a policy
of aggression and expans:"n. ""he necessity of holding in leash
a turbulent a>-my, which, if disbanded might work untold havoc on
the country, and at the same time problem of pacifying a
factious nobility and an equally uproarious commons both of whom
might enrage in strife unless their superfluity of energy was di-
rected into other channels, were factors which conditioned his
f reigr.
|
olicy. mhe glaring fact that the treasury was al-
fl) Carlson, ^e schic* to Schwedens, iv, 4 - 20.
Sain, Scandinavia, 228.
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most depleted by sixty years of war fare counted for naught as a
negative argument agninst renewed conquests or foreign invasions
in the faoe of thes~ difficulties.
Not only did internal affairs point to the necessity of
t ; is policy Hit the very position of Sweden at the time of the
ascension of Charles made it almost imperative. Beyond the Gulf
of ^othnie and the Baltic Sweden possessed Finland, Rsthonia,
Ingria, 'ivonia, territories which belonged to her before the
Thirty Ye-ir;;' Tar. Her acquisitions at the Peace of "estphalia
were numerous; she secured Test^rn Bomerania, Wisznar , the Duchies
of Bremen and Ve^den; and a garrison at Tarneraunde gave her com-
mand of the "^ort of Rostock. She also held important commercial
positions west of Courland especially along the mouths of the
mes9r, Blba, and nder. Her ambition was to gain vantage points
on the Vistula which now flowed thru Polish territory from its
source to the mouth. This river was the great highway for the
shipping of the chief of the Swedish products, wood, hemp, pitch,
and tar. If ncrts could be secured beyong th~ sea, Charles might
replenish his depleted treasury by tolls which he would be able
to charge. (1)
Regarding Charles' sudden attach on Boland, little need be
said here. By a rapid march into the heart of th^t kingdom he
was able, with tho help of the Brandenburg c mtingent, to win a
battle in July 16.^6 a^ter three days of strenuous fighting. Just
as he was preparing to prosecute his victory by pursuing the fugi-
tive John Casimir a powerful coalition wns being formed against
him. "he "ing of Denmar> prepared to invade Sweden, the Russians
(1) Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, III 427/
Cam. :iod. His., IV, 4C3-4C4.
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soon declared war, and the Tartars were knocking at ^ast Prussia.
Denmark regarded the attack of Charles on Poland as perilous for
her security, since any success which Charles might win, would
mean, perhaps fresh embargoes on the Eastern Baltic trade and in-
volve a serious diminution of the Sound tolls. Holland became
exercised over the fact that Char lee levied tolls upon the ship-
ping in the Baltic ports and sent a fleet into Danish waters to
maintain the freedom of the Baltic sea. The Czar of Russia offer-
ed to make a defensive and offensive alliance with Denmark, assur-
ing that country that he would not make peace with Sweden until
all territory which had been wrested from Denraar' was restored to
her. The King of Sweden with keen foresight mollified the hos-
tility of the Dutch by negotiating with them a treaty ( Convention
of Gibing, September 1, 166
6
v
which fav° them the position of the
most favored nation, ^inr Frederick ITT of Denmark regarded war
with Sweden as a sure means of recovering some of the lost pre-
rogatives of the crown, as well as some of the territory lost to
Sweden by the ^reaty of Bromsebro in 164T). On June 1, 16.r <7, he
signed a manifesto justifying his action but never issued a for-
mal declaration of war. (1) The manifesto which he prepared was
sent to the Courts of the principal powers of Europe. He asserted,
in this document, that contrary to the assurance riven by the
Swedish court, Denmark had be-n forcibly robbed of the Archbishop-
rics of Bremen and Verden nor had adequate reparation been made
for the "countries and cities and movables" taken from them as
fl) ^ iTi
>
Pol. His, of Denmar>, rorway and Sweden. 241-242,
Carlson, ^eschichte Schwedens. iv, 229-232x
Cam. Mod. His, iv, 583-4.

pr vided by the Treaty of ''romsobro. According to this Inst
mentioned treaty Swedish goods and ships were to he exenpt from
the payment of toll and custom but this privilege, the Danish
x
'ir\^ complained, had been grossly abused. "By false bills of
lading they had freed other than Swedish goods from paying these
dues, thus causing a serious diminution of Danish revenue. They
hid also insisted on prescribing to foreign shippers "how and what
custom they should pay in the Sound". After a protest and long
delay, the Swedes ga^e answer that it was contained in the Brom-
sebro ~reity that the ships might so demean themselves
;
though
they knew full well that this, as a strange business, did not con-
cern the 7'r-irasebro agreo ments, bu^ was contained and comprehended
in the Christianapolish treaty, made at large with the T ords the
"tates -eneral of the United Provinces. He Arraigned the King
of ^weden for r.aMng war on t v e city of Dantzig, for preventing
free intercourse to that city by excessive tolls which was con-
trary to the spirit and fact of the Treaty of "Bromsebro. The
Swedish king had pr hihi ted the "trading of Dantzig as if the
whole dominion at Sea, after which the Swedish aspire:! a long
tine, had fallen into his hand. Instead of remedying of that
which is past they seek to divert the channel of the river ^eyssel
quite another way fror. the city of Dantzig intending thereby to
obstruct the trading to that city; denying all equa] and just
reparation of the above laentioned defamations, wrongs, and dariages,
and breaking off the intended treaty of peace and friendship by
the recalling home the Swedish arent or deputy." (1)
(1) IJercurius Polltious, No. 7921, p. 571.

No more opnort ine move could have boon made by Denmark than
to declare war against qweden s'nce Charles now found a way to
extricate himself from the difficulties with which ho was beset in
Poland. "3y a prodigious march from the heart of that country he
appeared on the confines of Rolstoin on July 18th at the head of
an array of 6000 men in less than three weeks' time. He soon drove
the Danes from Prercen and their expulsion from Holstein followed
shortly after. "he Dandish x>orces no"- fled precipitately to Jut-
land and to their new fortress at yredeM ckssode which prove to
be a well nigh impregnable barrier against the expeditious designs
of Charles. "he duke of ^ottorp allied himself with the Swedish
king in the treaty of "iel (September l nthl.
His Highness the Protector of England had already viewed with
some alarm the outbreak of the war between Sweden and Denmark. The
Zing of Sweden looked to England for assistance and dispatched an
envoy to the English court for the purpose of securing effective
aid against his numerous enemies. The 'r ir\r of Sweden extended
irty frreetinr-n rid felicitations to Cromwell and expressed that
it wis his joy to count ''among the chief felicities of his age to
have a prince contemporary unto himself of such heroie er.dor^ents
,
as by the glorious fane of his abilities for pe ce and war, draws
all the world unto a just admire t'- on of him. ^esides the great
interest o f affairs between both nations and. the various mutual-
ities and obligations thence arising, and whom he finds with that
praise- or thy emulation so cheerfully and courageously carried on
still to ~ v.atsoover the oomr.on cause and exigency require; for
hence indeed it is apparent that rod made his oppressed militant
church against their >re r-<t insulting enemies, when is the rest,
and no less inte r ested parties, eit^e^ take no care at all of the
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said estate thereof, or oven thai .selva • Ho impiously rise up
against the sane, basely thus deserting anri betraying the coin
Bion Qause** He concluded his letter -.vi tl; a euccint en for an
alliance and delegated fteorge Meetwood to -4 ot as his represen-
tative in England. (1)
Tn Janu ry, Fleetwood asked the Protector for a loan. The
Protector in turn de^mded that the Swedes cede Bremen as security
for the money. This Charles was unwillinf to d o since he felt
that this territory was a necessary recruiting ground, for his
armies. Charles v:as "ill-'ng, however, to cede Oldenburg or East
Frier land but Cromwell spurned the offer. (2)
Cromwell regarded the powerful coalition wnieh was formed
against the T~ing of Sweden as a Catholic plot against a Protestant
°ower . He felt that Denmar> had been misguided and misled into
declaring war against Sweden and was thereby furthering the work
of the ^ope and the Pouse of Hapsburg in extirpating the Protestant
religion
.
In August, 1657, Charles sent Friersendorf to London to re-
new these offers with some further concessions. In addition to
the cession of Oldenburg, Charles now was ready to give up his
claim to the county of Delmenhorst, to surrender East Friesland,
and to allow the English to garrison the 3ishopric of Munster.
For these concessions, the Swedish King desired that t'^e English
should join him in his war to divide Denmark between the Protector
(1) Thurloe St. Paners
. vi
, 507.
(2) Carlson, qp. oit. 842.
Carlbora, Sverige och England
, 165f>-7, i3>;- 6 .
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and himse'f. ^ut he was not willing to surrender Brer:,en at
t is time. T ato' in the year (October and Norember) he gave
Friesendorf the power to of^er it but it was not acceptable to
Cromwell. ( X >
The unexpected resistance of the fortress of Freder ickssode
prevented the Ting of Sweden from making any further progress in
his military campaign until the middle of October. The Swedish
fleet, e-irly in September, had suffered a serious reversal in a
two days' battle. Charles was rapidly approaching a most serious
crisis in his career. In July, ] enmar"- negotiated an offensive
and defensive alliance with "oland. The Or eat Rector Frederick
William allied himself with Poland (Treaty of Wehlau, Sept. 1657)
and with Denmark (Treaty of Copenhagen, Oct. 20). Charles faced
B circle of enemies - Austrians, Poles, Brandenburger s and Danes.
Tith so many forces lined up against him he was re dy to accept
the iroferred mediation of France and England.
Chqrles,had, from the beginning of the war, looked for aid
from his oldest ally, France. Jhe wily Mazarin had promised him
ample subsidies if he would engage in a general war against the
house of Uistria. nhese promises had been renewed with de finite
assurance of even larger subsidies in September. (2) Although
anxious for financial assistance Charles was equally desirous of
securing the aid of the Engish fleet since England was tee only
power who could thwart the growing pretensions of Denmark.
(1) Carlbom, Sve^ire och England, 141-145
(2) Mazarin to French Ambassador, Carlson, "eschicte Schwedens,
iv. 243.
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As early as March, Philip Mead owe was appointed envoy extra-
ordinary to Denmark for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation
between the bolligeront kings. He did not actually sail, however,
till September 3. (1) in August the Protector sent Major-General
Jephson to Sweden on a like mission. (£) In the letter of credence
which Jephson was to bear to the "ing of Sweden the Protector pro-
claimed his earnest passion "to do all good offices, which Ood
shall put in our power ^or the healing of the breach, and there-
by prevent the evils and inconveniences, wh^ch must arise upon
the c imnon cause from this war, at a time when our enemie3 are
uniting and eng-.ging the .selves in most dangerous counsels and
practices against the profession and professors of the true re-
ligion". (3) In the secret letter which the ambassador was to
bear he was instructed to inform the Xing of Sweden that England
was not in a position to grant financ 'al aid owing to the depleted
condition of the treasury after the Dutch and Spanish wars. If
the Swedish T'ing was disposed to treat regarding Tremen t ) e Eng-
lish would be willing to send over land and naval forces to take
that place and keep as large a fleet as necessary to maintain the
status quo of the coast. The English desired definite assurances
as to what harbor rou* d be provided for the landing of the forces
in case the Enp.ish sent aid.
Meadowe's letter to the T'ing of Denmark expressed Cromwell's
regreta at news of war between the two states, "whose power and
(1) He was to have 400 L for preliminary expenses in addition to
l nC0£ a year salary. Cal. St. Papers, Pom., 1657-16.;)8
, 52,
(£) Ibid., 51.
(3) Thurloe St. Parser
s
T
vi
, 479
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force boinf conjoined Bight have been a terror to the comnon
enemy and of front advantage to tho Protestant interest; but
being turned one against the other , besides tho effusion of much
Christian blood and the weakening of thenselves , it must needs be
of front prejudice and hazard to the Protestant cause, especially
it this time when the Pope's party do with one consent arm against
the professors thereof in all pnrts of tho world; and it is cer-
tain that not v:'ng cou"1 d have fallen out more for the advantage of
Spain, who is a$ open war with us, and for the food of the King
of Hungary and that Austrian family, the head and chief pillar of
the Popish st-ite, than this rupture at this time".
I«Ia jor - r en oral Jephson urged the Secretary of State, Thurloe,
to send the fleot intimating that if 1 he T^ing of Denmark's ob-
stinacy would result in the devolution of the power of the Baltic
Sea to ' ther hands, assistance rendered the Kingof Sweden might
put n part of that sea in English control. The English ambassa-
dor soon saw that tho King of Sweden wis beset by so many enemies
he wo'iF. perforce have to make peace with some of them in order to
maintain the integrity of his interests both in Sweden and germany*
The Iwedes desired at least twenty ships. This need became all
the more urfent when grave fears arose that the Dutch were ready 1
to gr'int i sura of money and, if it were necessary, to send eighteen
Ships for the succor of the Dane, (l)
Mennwhile ^ri esend or ff and Fleetwood in England were using
their utmost ende vers to secure the naval aid in favor of Sweden.
Cn October 5, 1657, orders were issued to prepare a fleet of twenty
vessols for the "Baltic undo-- the command of Admiral Montagu.- "The
(1) Thurloe St. ^yrs
,
vi
,
582.
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design for the twenty Ships," wrote ^hurloe to Montagu, "is to
give countenance to Sweden whose affairs are in a most dangerous
condition, being left alone in the midst of very nany powerful
enemies, as the Pole, the T'ing of Hungary, the Muscovite and the
Dane: and fears also the Dutch, who five money, and if need be
will send to the Danes the eighteen ships which v.ere appointed
to be upon Dogger "Sank. The ministers of the "-ing of Sweden are
of the opinion that if twenty ships were sent that way to wait
upon the motions of the Dutch, though no act of unkindness passed,
yet it would Veep the Dutch from him." (1) mhe Dutch did not send
their ships and consequently Montagu's squadron remained at home.
Tephson made some attempts to explain to Charles the reasons
why the fleet was not sent, ""he Swedish ^ing replied that "he
wished either that had been done, or that so much occasion had
not been riven to expect it". He ilso asserted that if the Pro-
tector "had as much ca'ise to know the Tring of Denmark and the
rest of the Protestant princes in Germany as he himself hath (who
he saith '"or the most part do very little care for the obligation
of a promise, but submit still to the greater power), he would
have thought it the likeliest way to have brought Denmark to a
peace by making him afraid." (2)
The Swedish ambassadors wera assiduous in their efforts to
secure a loan. Pven in this they were unsuccessful. In November,
1657, the r rotector made a promise of a loan of 5,30, 00C to be paid
(1) Cat . St. Papers Pom
., 1657-8, 431, 432.
Thurloe St. Papers
,
vi , 582
(2) Thurloe St. Papers, vi
,
629, 643.
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in throe ninthly installments. 3y December the Oovernmont was
unable to ?<\'j tho first installmont averring that all ready money
was needed to pay off the crews of the fleet which had just re-
turned from the Mediterranean. (1)
In January, 16b8, Jephson had an interview with Charles X.
His report of it was as follows: "I disc^ ^so«l Largely to him the
reasons Which hindered you from riving that present supply of
money vrhich was promised and he very earnestly expected. He could
not for at least would not) seem to be unsatisfied with them; but
I found he was very much troubled that the th^'ng was not done. "(2)
The king's demands ^or assistance wero as follows: "Though
the King of Sweden be supplied with men yet it will be impossible
for him to po im with so rreat a war without some supply of money;
which ;ou may please to consider in what proportion aril on what
terms it nay be done. Then he says, that if the 3ring of Denmark
will not consent to a peace: 'twill not be possible for him to
carry on his war unless the Protector join with him against the
other; and therefore desires order may be given to the envoy in
Denmark to declare to the Tingof Denmark that, unless he will
assent to peaceon equitable terms, you will help Sweden against
him. Lastly he desires that, in the meantime, you would give
order to your pub lie minister in Ho n land to press the States
General not to assist the Tring of Denmark." (3)
(1) Ibid
,
vi , 674.
[Z\ Thurloe St. Paper s, vi, 727.
(3) Ibid,, vi, 729.

In January 1658 the Protector expressed grave apprehensions
l«Bt the Swedish "ing must succumb to the powerful coalition or-
ganised against him. In a speech which he delivered to Parliament
he declared that the question which such an issue of events had
raised "was whether the Christian rorld should he all popery''.
"The Protestant cause", he averred, "was struck at, nay, quite
trodden under foot." Sweden, the chief defender and champion
of Protestantism was ; n the midst of the gravest dangers, beset
on all sides by insidious foes. Charles was the only prince who
offered passab": s resistance to "this mighly cur rent coming: from
all parts against all Protestant," "a poor prince, and yet in
his person as gallant and as good, as any that these late ages
have brought forth. ... A man that hath adventured his a n l
against the Popish interest in Poland, and made his acquisitions
still g^od for the Protestant religion. He is now reduced into
a corner, and what addes to the grief of all is that men of our
religion forget this and seek his ruin." ITor were religious in-
terests alone concerned for the success of the coalition against
Charles would seriously threaten and endanger the maritime and
comLie^cial power of England. "If they can shut us out of the
"altic Sea, and make themselves masters of that, where is your
trade There are your materials to preserve your shipping? . . .
You hqve accounted yourselves happy in being environed with a
great ditch from 'ill the world besides. Truly, you will not be
able to keep your ditch, no r your shipping, unless you turn your
ships and shipping into troops of horse and companies of foot,
and Tight to defend yourselves on terra firma." (1)
(1) Carlyle, Cromwell's Speeches and Tetters
,
iv, 252 ff.
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The King of Denmark accepted the proferred mediation out
stipulated that ho w aid not treat unless all the countries whose
territory was washed by the wives of the Baltic Sea should be in-
cluded. Such a traity arrangement would include Poland who could
not, without breaking her treaty of alliance, negotiate without
the House of Austria. This would signify, as Jephson put it, that
the Protector would have to "become the mediator for reconciling
the differences between all the Catholic princes." In the mind
of the English ambassador a general treaty between all the Pro-
testant was a diseradatum highly advantageous not only to the
honor of the Protector but to the public interest as well. Treat-
ing with the several countries sep irately would "only palliate a
disease in some members, whereunto every relapse doubles the
danger to the whole body." (1)
It soon became apparent to Jephson that Sweden would demand
Scania and other places beyond the Baltic in lieu of Jutland and
Holstein. The Swedish King was firm in his belief that a per-
manent peace could not be secured until the distrust and jealousy
of Penmirk that the "Swedes under pretence of their own freedom"
would defraud th m of the tolls in the Sound, which the Dan'sfr
King called "an usurpation to the prejudice of Sweden, and others
on the Baltic Sea; and this he supcoseth cannot be done without
a general freedom of trade granted to all; and if nothinr be
thought fit to be given for satisfaction of the ~ ringof Denmark's
loss, which he says 1 ill not therein amount to above thirty-
thousand dollars a year." Such an amicable arrangement might be
effected in a yearly agreement with .-.uch princes and states that
(1) Thurloe 3tj Papers , vi , 628-9.
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had occasion to use the paltic. (1)
Hot lonp after the attack on Freder ickssode, which capitulated
(October 23-4) Charles nade strenuous preparations for assembling
tr ns^ort vessels in sufficient quantity to convey his troops to
Funan; but he was to be aided by an unexpected auxiliary force.
The weather in the latter part of Becembe- and the first part of
January 1658 rew intensely cold so that by the latter part of
January the ice over the kittle Belt was firm enough to support
an amy. Charles planned an attack on Funen by using the snail
island of "ran^so, which lay midway between Funen and Jutland, as
a support. By January i'Bth the cold had become most intense.
Charles no-r gave orders to his troops to start and only a short
interval of time elapsed before the Swedish troops occupied Br and so.
The advance continued over the ice, the troops dismounting whenever
it wis too thin, leading their horses as wide apart as possible
until the weak spot in the ice was passed. With marvelous rapidity
the Daniel) troops drawn up to oppose the Swedish advance were over-
whelmed and captured. Fun en itself was taken and the only loss in-
curred by Charles in this unique exploit was two conroanies of
cavalry which disappeared under the ice in the midst of the fight-
ing.
Y.o t content ~ith the successful outcome of Vis perilous
venture Charles now was fired with the virile ambition to cross
the Teat Belt in much the same way as he had crossed the Little
Belt. Here he was prompted and guided by the expert advice of
hia SkiHad and agile-minded compatriot, Brie Dahlberg, his chief
engineer. He strongly advised the circuitous route to Copenhagen
(11 Thurloe Bt> Papers , vi , 674.
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by way of Svandborg and the islands of LangeD and , Laaland
,
and Falster. Charles was not in agreement with the projected
plan of attack and only after long consultation and deliberation
which lasted the frrnater part of the night could he be moved to
see the requisite necessity and wisdom of the proposed route,
^h-^ cavalry began the invasion on the flight of February 5, cutting
their way thru the ice which thawed beneath the horses' hoofs
and made marching perilous for the infantry who faced the immi-
nent danrer of falling thru the melted ice. The besieging host
reached the island of Laaland in safety and the fortress there
capitulated without a struggle. Tn less than a week, Charles
was on "terra fir.na", the entire army uniting their forces in
Zealand. "Natura hoc debuit unl" was the conceited inscription
the medal bore which Charles ordered to be struck in commemora-
tion of th«. event.
When the news of the taking of Funen had heon received,
Frederick III, the King of Denmar'., signified his willingness to
enter into peace negotiations with the Ting of Sweden and sent
for Philii ::eadowe. He nominated his commissioners, leaving
the choice of time and place to the ple asure of the Swedish Iling.
Upon information from the English ambassador that the Danish king
was ready to sue for peace, Charles appointed ^ielk and Ulfield
as his representatives and chose Langeland as the place for treat-
ing. Sir ^hilip -lead owe secured an interview with the Swedish
sovereign and pressed upon him the cofent necessity for amity
and friendship between him and trie <:ing of Denmark. Such an
arrangement could only come about as a result of the willingness
of Chnrles to agree to a suspension of hostilities during the
•Mrr.o t\oq p fi noon ti «ti ons were being conducted. This was unobtain-
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able from the Swedish king who, although courteous, nevertheless
remained resolved and determined. "Cod hid shown him the way and
built him a bridge and he could do no less than go over." were the
words he uttered in the presence of the representative of the Com-
monwealth who reported them bacv to Secretary of State. (1)
The next day the Commissioners, together with the French am-
bassador, acting in the capacity of mediators, met at "'arenburg
and b-?gan the first nef otd ations looking to a final cessation of
hostilities between the Scandinavian kings who had, in the mean-
time, agreed to grant the formalities of "modus tractandi" and
the like. ^he Commissioners of Denmark presented their project
for the solution of the difficulties, and then the Swedes their
dr^ft articles. The English mediator, Meadowe, regarded them
both as monsters, "one in defectu, the other in excessu". So di-
vergent were the claims of *"he opposing parties, that the media-
tors despaired of healing the estrangement, unless one or both °f
th ? parties concerned could be mnde to abate the more unreasonable
of their demands. The Swedes desired Scania, "Bleking, Bornholm,
sahus, Fronten, (2) in addition to 4000 armed troops, horse and
foot, eight of the best Danish ships, and a sum of money. (3)
The French and English mediators drew up a r>ian for consideration
which they considered equitable to both countries and pressed the
negotiators to accept it. The city of Copenhagen could scarcely
hope to hole out against the grizzled veterans of Charles' army.
(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 302.
(2) Probably another form of Trondhjem.
(3) Thurloe St. r aoers, vi , 803.
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Nor could tho "ing of Denmark expect aid from the Poles ard Iranden-
burper^ who were far remote. "Unless T mnko a peace, adieu Denmark
was the decision of the "ing of Denmark afte" surveying the si tua-
tion. (ll 'Towever preposterous the Swedish proposals seemed at
first Denmark was forced tr> accede to them when negotiations were
opened again near P.oeskild. She agreed to transfer Scania, Halland
and ^lo-ing, the island of "Bornholm, Badus and ^rondhjem, Norwegian
provinces. She was subjected to the further humiliation of furnish-
ing -l^OO troops, half Infantry and half cavalry to the Swedish king,
to renounce all an ti -Swedish illiances, and to exempt Swedish ves-
sels even wh^n carrying foreign goods to pay toll. (2) ^he Sound
wis tc be closed by both countries to any hostile fleets. Such a
treaty wis thoroughly consonant with English aspirations in the
Sound. It was to the material interest of England to keep the
Sound from falling into tho hands of one power which might then
dictate at will toll dules and exactions. The division of the
narrow entry into the ^altic between two emulous powers was a pre-
ventative of further exactions or usurpations in the Sound.
A wonderful display of friendship and good will between the
two r cmdinavian kings occurred after the signing of the peace
treaty. Charles, at the express wish of ^ing "rederick came to
Fredericksburg where he was entertained with the utmost of regal
srlendor. ""he English ambassador, Sir Philip lileadowe, in company
with the Panish king went out about three miles from Fredericks-
burg to meet his majesty the "ing of Sweden who was then on his
fll Thurloe St. Parer-
,
vi
, 802 ff.
l2) Bqin
>
c^dinavia. 247; Thurloe St. Papers , vi, 802
n
'ardor
'' glgtolre "Bnerale des "raitos de Palx. i, 97.
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way from Roeakild. ""he "ing of DenmarV wns attended by about 600
horse in addition to his ordinary guard of gentlemen an3 officers,
the "ing of "wed en by 400 horse, besides the attendants of his
court. Ill form and ceremony was most cautiously observed. Both
kings alighted out of their coaches at the same time and each wont
forward at an appropriate distance on foot, to meet and salute the
other. The "ing of Denmark then escorted the wedish king to his
coach, giving him the place of honor, the English Plenipotentiary
and the duke of Sundur burgh seating themselves at the left. From
Thursday until Saturday numerous banquets and entertainments were
held. T t Beamed, indeed, that the erstwhile belligerent monarchs
were reconciled red the apparent amity and friendship which exist-
ed between them augured well for the future peace nnd security of
the two countries. (1)
1J Thar 09 3^t. vi> 850>

80.
qh1ftbb it.
hjolish ih^rtf::^ 0}1 t?T tip second datitsh tar.
The n:ere signing of the treaty of Roeskild did not, "by any
mesns, adjust all the difficulties connected with the execution
of the salient changes wrought by that peace arrangement. Many
points were yet in dispute and the commissioners labored long and
strenuously to eventuate the desired readjustments. Negotiations
continued during the months of March and April. It is quite pro-
bable that Charles hoped to use the army quartered in Denmark to
wrest new concessions. He himself seems to have been engrossed
with the idea of forming a Scandinavian union which would clearly
involve the subjection of Denmark to the overweening influence of
Sweden. He meant to adopt the title, "Xing of Sweden and the ^olhs
of Denmark, "Jorway, and the '"ends." He had even j one so far as to
settle tho porm of installation. His mind loved to dwell on the
picture of his new .subjects doing homage to him in Scania, he wear-
ing the Swedish crown on his head and the Danish crorn lying before
him on a table. (1). Attempts of the Swedes to form such an alli-
ance encountered hostile opposition or. the part of the Dutch who
wer? assiduous in their determination to prevent a conjunction of
the two powers, since such a union would play havoc with Dutch mari-
time interests and aspirations. They exercised a monopoly of the
carrying trade w ; th Russia and Danzig and did not relish the idea
of facing a powerful competitor in their lucrative industry.
(1) Carlson, op. cit. , 309.
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Charles became insistent in his demand that the Danes assist
him in closing the Sound to foreign armaments. In June he acquiesc-
ed to a Scandinavian defensive alliance on condition that the Danes
agree to his demand8. ^his would mean that Denmark would have to
renounce the then existing alliance wltb the Dutch, a condition
wli^h sat too hard upon the Danes. Charles had also some room for
complaint that the terms of the ""reaty of Hoeskild had never been
fully carried out. In June, 1658 Lleadowe reported to his Govern-
ment the status of affairs in Sweden. "The Swedish maxim is that
the Dane will never want the will to do them hurt, and therefore
they r.ust take away his power. mhey thought the terms of the peace
too fnvor-ihle to Tenmark. . ; . I know several of the Swedish sena-
tors at their convention at Cottenburg, besides the military men of
the army, were displeased that his Majesty had so tEated away an
opportunity the fairest that ever prince, had, and upon the justest
quarrel too, of possessing himself entirely of that kingdom; and
some reflections were cast upon me upon that account , whi ch makes
the Swedes more rirorous in exacting the utmost of the conditions
agreed, and I wish they do no more." (1) Charles with an unresi-
lent fixity of purpose determined to obliterate the Kingdom of Den-
mark from the map of Europe. (2) He now prepared to continue his
program of attach which had been arrested by the Teace of hoeskild,
(1) English Historical BgTlew
,
vii, 737.
(2) The real cuases of the so-called second Danish War have not as
yet been clearly elucidated by historical research. TTo attempt has
been made here to determine the ultimate reasons for Charles' sud-
denly renewed attack on Denmark.
n pm
^
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namely, to take the city of Vp^nhao; =r itself. "'ho consent of the
?.ed (Sonata) was obtained on July 7 and in less than t -ooks
General mrangel received orders to shv- *- v j cavalry fron Kiel to
Kaaland, u:d to prepare for a direct attnc': on the Danish capital.
All formalities of making a declaration of war were swept aside in
his anbitior to oruan a hostile neighbor. Considerations for the
standards o p international equity were glaringly absent. (1) On
August 5, 1658 Charles embarked from "iel. His fleet was made up
of eleven war vessels and sixty transport ships, with about 4000
cavalry and 12^0 infantry. Two days later the nrny landed at Torsor,
the advance guard leaving at once for Copenhagen. The main army
was unable to march vvith such rapidity and did not cone to the city
until the eleventh. The first news of the proposed Swedish attack
on Copenhagen came on Sunday the 8th, during the holding- of church
services. The city was soon in the utmost consternation and excite -
Dent. There were only tibout 400 soldiers within the walls of the
city. The fortifications were in the poorest condition, the breast
works scarcely three feet high. The T7ing was urged to flee to Tar
-
way but raver counsels inspired him to remain and he declared with
admirable fortitude that "he would die as a bird in his nest." The
brave spirit evinced by the T'ing was contagious and his subjects
displayed unwonted loyalty and devotion. On Aug; st (J representa-
tives of the Uajestracy, the Clergy, and the teachingprofession
were summoned at the call of the Xing to the Royal Castle and asked
(1) Cam lilod. Hist.
,
iv, 586-7.
I. ^ain, Scandi navj
a
,
24 8-2J>r>.
Carlson, JVsschichte Sghwedeng , ZCQ ff.
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if they wished to risk life for the defense of the Fatherland.
With ren'i r'-able unanimity they answered in the aff i nn< ti ve . About
1£0C soldiers assembled at the sumnons of the alarm drum and all
who had been transferred elsewhere in surround: nt territory came
to the city. Svery citizen felt it incumbent upon himself to be-
co.r.e s 'ldier in t ho defense of his city. liven the students, 600
or more, armed themselves md joined the valiant conglomer a te host
composed of soldiers, citizens, nobility* and students in repairing
the defense of the walls. The suburbs were abandoned and burned.
Cattle were driven inside the fortifications to supply the city in
the event of a long siere. (1)
On August 11 Charles drew his army up before Copenhagen.
His proposed method of attack had been to storm the city immedate-
ly upon his arrival, but the Bight of the burnt suburbs deterred
him and he halted to cnll a conference at Vallpey Hill. Lahlberg,
his chief engineer, advised taking t 1 e city by assault; but the
rest of his councillors felt that the army was too weak to under-
take Kuch an herculean task and the danger too great in case the
attack failed. Trangel urged the storming of Kronborg, which guard-
ed the northern entrance to the Sound. This plan found favor v;ith
the Swedish King and on the 15th he dispatched "'rangel with 3000
men to t°ko the castle. (2)
The news of Charles' suddenly renewed attack upon Denmark
caused renewed disturbances in the council rooms of European
diplomats." "J'avoue que je suis dans la plus grande inquietude
que J'ai jamais," wrote Mazarin to Terlon. The three powers of
(1) Carlson, Creschlchte r:chweden»s
, 311.
Bain, op. Git .. 251.
(2) Carlson, op. cit., 313
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Brandenburg, Austria, and Poland viewed with especial alarm the
rapacious designs of the northern king. Theirs wa^; a fear that,
if Charles were successful, the free intercourse of nations trad-
ing in the "Baltic would b* restricted and not only Prussia, but
the Sound and all the north would be subjected to the nascent
Empire of Sweden, They allshared the desire to aid Denmark and
extricate her fron the perilous position in which she was involved
and tl ereby ward off impending attacks on their own domains. The
provinces of the United Nether lands were unusually active in thwart-
in- the advance of the Swede. By a treqty with Denmark in 1649
they rested under the obligation of furnishing aid to Lenmark in
case the latter were attached; they were all the more eager to ful-
fill their treaty obligations when imminent disaster threatened
their all important and vital trade interests. With almost in-
credible celerity they assembled a most formidable fleet of thirty-
five war vessels an^ a large number of transports, carrying on
board about 2000 mr?n. ^he fleet was in charge of Admiral Opdam,
Vice-Admiral Cornelius de r*itte, and Peter Floris. On October 29
the Dutch fleet sailed with a full wind into the Sound. Here they
met the Swedish fleet, forty-four vessels strong with some 7000
men on board and with 1846 cannon under the command of Admiral
T angel, Bjelkenst Jerna
,
Sjohjelm, and G. Wrangel, (l) The two
fleets began the engagement between seven and eight o'clock in the
morning. Admiral "'itte was the first to come into fire aid in the
course of the battle was fatally -ounded. Four Dutch ships were
burned or sunk, others were badly damaged, while the Swedes suffer-
ed a loss of only two vessels, one to the enemy, the other by go-
(1) Bain, o_£. ci t
.
, 252, gives the size of the fleet 40 war vessels
and 28 trannnorts, with an army of 2200 m^n . Papa 258.
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ing aground. The combined Dutch and Danish fleets, however, re-
mained masters of the sea and the r,wedish pleet was forced to re-
tire to Landeskron-i.
Of the events of the next few months little can he said here.
Successful issue crowned the efforts to the Danes to capture mrond-
hje.; disaffection and an uprising among the inhabitants gave them
Fornholm. Doles, "rand enburger s , and Austrians combined their
forces and stormed Thorn in Frussia, the Treat Elector and Ilontes-
culi leading the host. "By the end of 1658 Denmark had recovered
Jutland . ( 1
)
Charles, as in his previous war counted on receiving sub-
stantial aid from Tngland. He sent a letter to Cromwell explain-
ing his reasons for attacking Denmark and just- fying his action.
"The King of Sweden hath invaded the Dane and very probably hath
Copenhagen by this time," wrote Thurloe to Henry Cromwell on August
27. He felt that Denmark would be "in all probability utterly lost..
If Denmark be lost ?!orway will folio", the same fate, and then his
Majesty of Sweden may abbreviate his long title and write hi".self
Xing of the TTorth." (2) ;:ore especially did he desire that Eng-
land send a fleet to act in conjunction with his own against the
combined squadrons of the Dutch and the Danes. The necessity for
prompt action on the part of Cromwell was urged vehemently by the
French, $hru their ambassador in England. To the importunate de-
mands of the French the Secretary of State replied that England was
at peace with all nations and that she was not anxious to become
involved in a fresh imbroglio. Charles X had begun the war anew
(1) Carlson, op. cit.
,
717 ff.
[(2) Thurloe Tt. Par.era, vii, 3:59 .345 36?1
—
*
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and had broken a most solemn treaty which the English had been in-
stru ontal in securing thru their intervention. Such a breach of
faith constituted a reprehensible error, in the mind of the Protector
Concommitantly
, the English could not witness, with pacific mien,
the surrender of all the northern lands to him who wielded the
sceptre of the Swedes. To this the French ambassador, Bourdeaux,
could only reply that it was no less to the interests of England
than France to bring succor to the Swedish king, especially a prince
who had been s nstr umentnl in diverting the common enemies of these
two countri es. ( 1
)
Previous to the aforementioned interview with the Secretary of
State, the French ambassador had visited the principal ministers
of the Council of State urging upon them the necessity for sending
naval aid to the "ing of °weden. "'hree days later, they were dis-
posed to follow this advice and orders were sent to the fleet at
;
Drnes to be prepared to make a voyage to the Sound. Three days
later the rench ambassador was courteously informed that the Fro-
! tector had no desire to become entangled in the affairs of the
ITorth. This sudden reversion of feeling was attributed to the
: hostility that some mebers of the council had for "ieutenant-^eneral
?leetwood whose brother was acting as representative of the T-'ird of
"weden In Snrland. It was rumored that several ministers in the
:
council sympathized with Holland and wished to avoid any pretext ffor
engag'ng in a new war with that country. (2)
1 fl) Bourdeaux to Cardinal l.Iazarin, Quizot, Ilistoire de R. Crom-
well I, 254.
1
(2) Ibid., 249, 2(34.

Sngland was unwilling to bear the entire expanse of fitting
out a navy without the assurance of some financial assi tance from
- nee. mhe "rench ambassador labored at length to show "hurloe,
the Secretary of f^tate, that, up to the present time England had
incurred little oxnmse and she had been able to enjoy the fruits
of th-1 diversion of Swedish interests to Germany by being permitted
to take Dunkirk, besides the French treasury was well nigh depleted
by the expenditure of 400,000 francs during that year and could ill
afford any further drains. The English were ever solicitous lest
naval aid sent to the Swedes would provoke hostilities between ttem
and Holland since maritime interests of both had often clashed be-
fore. Animated by the fear of war, t v ey desired a definite declara-
tion of what the French attitude would be, since they felt it would
be a gross injustice for them to bear the brunt of the war alone.
The Frenoh ambassador attemped to allay the fears of the English
by proving that any assistance rendered by them cou'd not be con-
strued as an unfriendly act toward Holland. He declared that such
usage was common among nations and that the Dutch themselves had
given an example of it. (1)
Despite the overwhelming opposition wh:'ch Charles faced he did
not surrender his sanguine hope of taking Copenhagen. A ferocious
assualt was made on the city on the night of vebruary 10-11, 16 59,
but the Swedes were repulsed. Charles suffered irreparable losses
in many of his be3t officers and men. He was now forced to entrench
hirself on the Danish island. His hope in this crisis lay with
TSiglund. In tho meantime Oliver Cromwell had died but Richard the
(1) Bourdeaux to Cardinal Uazarin, Histoire de H. Cromwell I 254
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young Protector had fiven evidences of his friendship toward Sweden.
After wearisome deliberation and counsel, the French and the Eng-
lish had been able to come together to sign a guarantee Treaty, for
the purpose of intervening in the northern War and bring about a
peace between Sweden and her enemies, with the possible exception
of Austria, against whom France desired to employ the Swedish
forces. ( 1
)
The two mediating nowers agreed to propose to the two belli-
gerent Kings of ^weden and Denmark: first, a renewal of the treaty
of P.oeskild without including their allies or confederates; second,
to declare themselves enemies to him who refuse these terms and
assist him who accepted them; third, to send ambassadors to the
Dutch to induce them to join the proposed mediation; fourth, if
war should be declared on England by reason of any assistance
rendered, that ''"ranee should aid Kngland or if, on the contrary,
war should be declared against France, England should come to the
rescue; fifth, that after peace had been made between Denmark
and 'owed en to interpose to reconcile the differences of the 'Ting
of Poland and the Duke of ^randenburg with Sweden.
On April 6, 1659 the Bnglish fleet, forty- three ships strong
of which the greatest vessel carried 80 guns, the smallest £8,
under the command of Admiral Hontagu sailed for the Sound. The
Admiral had been sent as it afterwards proved to maintain the
equilibrium of the Sound against the Dutch.
In the debate in Parliament which followed the sending of the
fleet, Thurloe, Secretary of State, related in detail the progress
(1) Carlson, op. cit.
T
3S0-332.
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of affairs in the north of ^lrope, especially the situation in the
r altic. This Included a recital of the agreements then existing
among the powers, the vital interests of each in the Baltic, and
the new turn in events in that part of the world. He announced
that the new Protector Diehard had seen fit to send a fleet to the
"Hal tie not for the purpose of espousing the cause of any one of
the belligerents, nor to become involved in a war in which the
English could have "kittle interest, but for maintaining a watchful
eye and surveillance on English commerce and the general interests
of the nation.. One of the members entertained a covert suspicion
that information regard ing the Baltic situation had been withheld.
The Secretary of State hastened to assure him that everything had
been conducted in a perfect spirit of candor and any aspersions
which might be cast on the Secretary were wholly unwarranted and
uncharitable. A vote of confidence, 176 to 98, left to his High-
ness, the "ord Protector, the privilege of executing the vote of
Darliament concerning the equipment of the fleet etc, but the
question of war or peace was reserved as a prerogative of Parlia-
ment. (11
Pressure had been brought to bear as early as December, B58,
to force Holland to accede to the proposed mediation by France
and "Sngland. The Dutch looted askance at the designs of the Eng-
lish and French and desired to know upon what grounds the King of
-weden and the -ling of Denmark would proceed to treat, for unless
these two powers were somewhat evenly balanced in their power, they
would be perpetually at war, making it necessary for the Dutch to
defend one of them. The Dutch prepared to send a good fleet with
(1) Burton, Diary Til, 315, 376-385.
Journals of the TTo us 9 of Commons, 1651-9, vii, 606.
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4000 nan to the Sound. Ihey were in favor of reverting to the
terms of the treaty made in 164ft between Sweden and Denmark and of
forcing the King of Sweden to disrorge the possessions which he
had won by the "reaty of Roeskild. This proposal both the English
and 7rench felt to be most unreasonable and almost ridiculous more
especially since they regarded the second Danish r.'ar a mere con-
tinuation of the fjrst as a result of the animos: ties and jealousies
over the non full execution of the ~reaty of Roeskild. They had
small hope of bringing the King of Sweden to accept such hard terms
since he would never consent to evacuate Scania and the other places
which he had ron "vithout a protracted struggle. Then there was the
ever potent fear that the " ring of "weden might march into "lolstein
and endeavorto fight the elector of "Brandenburg. If he were success
ful the Dutch might rue the consequences . Other arguments, equally
ponderous were recounted to influence the Dutch in making a decision
favorable to the mediators. They were importuned to consider that
their treaty with Denmark was defensive in character only, but that
Scania and t v.e other terr tory acquired by Sweden at the Treaty of
Hoeskild could not but be rightfully counted as a legal possession
of Sweden and any connivance with the Danes to wra3t this territory
from the I-Tinr of Sweden would immediately change the status of the
then oxistinr alliance to an offensive treaty against Sweden.
However, both the French and ^ng^.ish ambassadors were ready to ac-
quiesce in the proposal to modify or even cm eel some of the pro-
visions of the "reaty of Roe ski Id
,
especially those articles which
concerned the passing of shipa thu the Sound many of which were S 1
defined and gave room for constant complaint by the Dutch, neither
the French nor ~nglish liked the provision. In case of war it was
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certainly undesirable that ei ther the Swedish or the Danish king
might claim from the other the rirht of excluding the ships of the
country with whom they were at war. Tt was surely to the advantage
of all countries which had interests in the ^altic, in case of war
with one of the northern kings to be able to pass thru the §ound . ( 1
)
The ^glish were prone to cast the charge of dis ingenuiness at the
Dutch. "The truth is, they would give the law to all Europe, and
not receive it from any, and have England and trance, and everybody
else, steer after their compass, and their north pole is their
traffic, measuring all things only by that, without any other con-
siderations whatsoever, and in the which they are not willing any-
body else should have the least share; and this trade of the Bast
ea is one of their rr eat mysteries in trade, they vending there
what they bring out of the east, south, and west; and again supply-
ing other countries with the commodities of that sea; Poland alone
spent more pepper than all the rest of Europe; and by this backing
the "ing of Denmark, nnd bringing down the "ing of Sweden they
thought to make themselves absolute masters of that sea; and although
their 3pa"i ish and Bast Tndy trade be richer, yet the destroying of
this trade is also the destroying of those other; but besides the
commodities of the Bast "ea being bulky, did employ numbers of ships
and seamen, so that failure thereof will make them inconsiderable
in both." (2)
(1) Thurloe ~.t. Parsers, vi i , 523.
(2)
.
downing, the Sog. Ambassador in "Tolland to ^hurloe,
TTmrlog ~t. "apers, vi i , 525
.
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With "both "ngland and vrance laboring to secure the acquies-
cence of T'olland to a joint mediation, that country was almost
forced to consent s:*nce she feared a breach with Bngland if she
continued the war. <^n Hay 11, 1659, the so-called first Hague
Concert was signed by the three powers of branch, England and the
"etherlands, in which thoy mutually agreed to end the war on the
basis of the ""reaty of RoeBltild. In this Concert England showed
herself to side with the interests of Sweden, Holland the least.
The presence of the strong ISnglish fleet in the Hound deterred
the Tutch from taVing any contrary action and gave the English
the preponderance of Influence.
Ee who finds his way thru the manifold and diverting in-
terests of diplomacy natural ly stops to propound this question
to ' irselT: ifhy r'id Bngland manifest such an abiding :nd inter.se
Interest in the northern aff airs" .i irtial solution to this
question has been indicated in the negotiations leading up to
the consent of England to join in the mediation. The pressure
brought to hoar by :*Tance was no doubt one of the potent factors.
But even more cogent reasons than the extraneous influence exer-
cised by the wily Bazarin can be detected: more than one individual
raised the doubt whether it would be for the material interests of
Sngland, especially ^or their trade and commerce in the Baltic
that the control of the Soiznd should potentially belong to the
Swedish kinf who might raise or lower tolls at will. Should success
crown Charles' endeavors Sngland was perturbed over such a victory
giving "the Swede the sold and entire possession of the chief
materials, as masts, deals, pitch, tar, copper, iron etc. needful
for the apparel and equipage of our ships, too great a treasure to
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bo entrusted in one hand." (l) Some had serious misgivings over
the wisdom of joining with France, wo did not feel that "the con-
science, honor, or trade or navigation and our fleet, yea the safety
of the Stat";, Ought to be set at stake to gratify the French; who
dou tless for one o P these two reasons, endeavor to enlace us in
this over-hasty war, against both our own interests and our allies,
oither that they nay thereby advance and enlarge their conquest
upon the ^erman Empire and make themselves Master of all Flanders;
or rather that they may set all Protestant Princes and States at
variance, then make peace with Spain and so at last extirpate the
Protestant religion having first weakened the defenders thereof by
their own arms." (2)
Immediately upon conclusion of the deliberations of the Hague
Concert the Dutch sent their fleet to the Sound under the command
of Admiral Ruyter, carrying on board the four representatives from
the Netherlands, two destined for Sweden, and two for Denmark to
act as mediators. The Council of State and Parliament of England
appointed COlonel Algernon Sidney, Admiral Edwin Montagu, Sir
Robert "oneyood and Thomas Boone as ambassadors (3) on July 1, 1659.
White ocke had refused to accept an appointment excusing himself on
the grounds of old age and other infirmities. His real reasons
were otherwise. Since he had been ambassador to Sweden alone, he
was not disposed to undertake a task which might involve him in
some unpleasant consequences over the questions of precedence and
(1) Somers' Tracts, vi , 330.
(2) Somers' Tgaotgj ii, 584.
(3) Gal. St. Papers (dom. ] 1658-59, 390; 1659-1660, 1.
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the like. He was therefore released from his appointment. (1)
Sidnoy, Honeywood, ant' Boone were all three nembers of Parliament,
Sidney being a member of the Councjl of State.
In July the second Hague Concert was signed by England and
the Netherlands. According to the terms of this treaty Trondhjem
should be given to Denrairlc. Further provisions made it incumbent
on these mediating powers to use their combined fleets against him
who refused to accept the conditions laid down in the first Hague
Concert within a fortnight. The French minister refused to sign
the treaty for fear of losinr such a valuable ally as Sweden in
the event that he should prosecute a war against Austria. (2)
The -English .embassadors, on July Si, had a private audience with
the King of Sweden at which they proposed a treaty between him aid
his enemy, Denmark. They desired that he nominate a time, place,
and commissior ers; that he order hostilities to cease during the
time that the negotiations were being conducted. Charles ve "y
pertinently renlied, albeit courteously, that he had by several
declarations and communications sufficiently evidenced his sincere
desire of peace. He left it to the better judgment of the Ambassa-
dors whether such a peace with Denmark should be a general or par-
ticular one. This he followed with a lengthy and querulous pro-
legomena of all the straits in vhich he had found himself since he
came to the throne of Sweden, with a vehement tirade against the
multitude of enemies wherewith he was oppressed. He evinced an
earnest desire for peace but could not nominate commissioners nor
(1) TThi' elocke? Memorials , iv , 351.
Cal
.
St. Papers ( Dom. ) 1659-1660, 11.
(2) Carlson, op. cit.
,
340.
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designate a time and place for meeting, nor issue safe conducts,
until he knew whether or not the King of Denmark had a mind to treo t
with hin. On the -first of August the English ambassadors held a
conference concerning the progress already made in their appointed
task. They thereupon resolved to go to Copenhagen and to s ound the
King of Denmark regarding the proposed peace arrangements. The
latter replied that the 'Aing of Sweden had broken the Treaty of
Roeskild, even contrary to the plighted faith which he had fiven
to observe the same; that he had, without sufficient provocation
wasted and harried the country, pillaged and destroyed royal poss-
essions, an^ as the greatest injury of all had forced the King to
shut himself up in his capital. In order to extricate himself from
perilous position in which he was placed and avoid complete annihila-
tion, the Danish king had called on the Emperor, the King of Poland
and the Duke of Brandenburg to come to his assistance. Under these
;
circumstances he desired that his allies should be comprehended in
the treaty.
The next day following this interview the r ix-hoffmaster (1)
of Denmark informed the Commissioners that the King had dispatched
a messenger to the Duke of Brandenburg to ascertain if he desired
'to be ncluded in the treaty. This he said was done, because the
Danish king regarded himself more closely allied to him than any
one else. mhe Danish king had promised to bring the strongest in-
11) Rix-hoffmaster , an official whose title may be rendered in
|
Ingllsta as "Royal High Steward". The titJLe suggests his duties
i and functions at the Danish Court.
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fluence to hear on the Duke but having done all in his power to
persuade him, if he did refuse, he would proceed to treat without
him. The Commissi oners were unwilling to delay and therefore de-
sired immediate assent to a treaty to be based on the Treaty of
Roeskild. To the importunate demands of the Commissioners the
hoffmaster rejoined that according to the above mentioned treaty
Sweden was to deliver up to the Danes the provinces of Jutland and
Holstein, a concession which he felt the Sweden would never make.
Ke further opined that if A he Danes should treat without their
allies and peace should not ensue the 'Ting of Denmark would be
desarted by his erstwhile friends who would then be free to turn
aga'nst him. ""he Danes, however, consented to treat wit h the
Commissioners, rho had the opportunity of goin-" between the two
parties concerned and were, in a measure, in a better posi tion
to terminate or adjust whatever differences existed. This the
"D.rrlish Commissioners found very suitable to their instructions
and most probably to put an end to wrangling over titles, pro-
cedure, time, place, etc. mhe Commissioners then desired to know
what alterations or excisions the Danish Tling desired in the "Dreaty
of Doeskild. The next few days were consumed in consultation with
the r ix - h o ffma s t er and some of the Danish Senators, one of whom
lugubriously discoursed on the cruelty, unfaithfulness, and cupidity
of the Swedish king. He asserted that the Danes were dependent up-
on the mediators, especially those of England, for making peace and
he attempted to show that it was to the interest of England, above
all other nations, to maintain the security of Denmark in order
to preserve a proper equilibrium in the north, Denmark acting as
a balance to Sweden. If this equilibrium were unduly disturbed
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and the ^wede allowed to pain the entire mastery ovor "ft e Sound
and the ^altio Sea, he mirht prove extremely vexatious to all his
neighbors who might have occasion to trade there.
To these proposals the Commissioners made a brief reply in
which they stated it was not their intention, much less th eir desire
to oppress the "inp of Denmark, but rather to reconcile the two
kings and make such a peace for the Danish ITing as might be thor-
oughly consonant with the principles of justice and equity and
the present condition of affairs of those states most interested
in the war and more especially those who had commercial interests
in the Baltic. "hey pave definite assurances that they would exert
utmost care and diligence in employing such means as would most
likely effect an amicable settlement. Following this protracted
conference the Commissioners retired to Slsinore. (l)
On the 8th of August two of the English Commissioners, Honey-
wood and Sidney, went to Fredericksburg, where they requested an
audience with the King of Denmark. This the latter was unwilling
to grant, excusing himself on the grounds of an Indisposition but
appointing in his stead two senators to hear any proposals which
the Bnglish plenipotentiaries might make. The English felt that
he was only feigning illness because he disliked the agreement
made by the powers at the Hague and because he had some apprehensions
lest the Commissioners would force him to accede to a treaty arrange-
ment which he did not like. At the appointed time of meeting the
English mediators found two senators, two secretaries, and two oii; er
clerks who during the interview wrote down all that was said by the
Commissioners, an act which the latter regarded as almost discourteous
Thurloe r,t. Papers
,
vii, 724 ff.
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The Commissi oners laid "before the Danish representatives a proposal
that the treaty should he negotiated "between "both parties interested
by the mediators thus avoiding a ser !,ms loss of tine which might
"be frittered away in frivolous disputes upon the preliminaries ard
other points which night engender cavils. Upon receipt of the writ-
ten acceptance "by the King of Sweden of the Treaty of ?.oes>ild, or
any exceptions whioh he might make to it, the Btaglish promised to
communicate to the other powers and endetvor, in all seriousness
and fidelity, to secure a permanent peace which would he at once
equitable qnd h<mora*le. ""he Danish representatives were by no
means in favor of this solution of t v ^ir difficulties but the Eng-
lish Commissioners argued that only in thiswise could the estrange-
ment h^ 1 epled in the tine which the English feet was all 07; ed to
stay in the Sound.
The Danes took the matter under advisement, and promised to
Bke b report to their Majesty and bring a speedy answer. On
LUgUSt 3 they were ready to submit a reply. The two senators and
the two secretaries who had treated previously cine to the English
Commissioners with a reply that they would not treat otherwise than
by plenipotentiaries regularly appointed. The SngZia-h representative!
divined their occult motives to delay the peace arrangements until
the English and Dutch fleets had been forced to retire. They re-
fused to he shunted off in this wise and accordingly demanded an
audience from the King, whereupon they were informed that he was
indisposed and unable to see the Commi ssi oners . He, however,
a; pointed agents to treat but the English felt that this would
only result in ser'ou3 delays and would never bring the two kings
closer together. "The Commissioners than Spent some time in framing
a project "or a treaty based upon the agreement made at the "ague.

which they prposed to submit to the two kin s and to proceed against
him who refused to accept it as provided for in tho Hague Concert.
(1)
On \ugnst 24 a letter of instructions was sent to •Idmiral
idontagu in which the Council of State instructed him to employ
his utmost endeavors to remove all misunderstandings which had aris en
between the ''ing of Sweden and the United Provinces. He was warned
not to join the fleet under his command to the navy of either Sweden
or Denmark, nor to give comfort or aid to either of the warring
powers. He wis enjoined to refrain from any act of hostility against
either of the belligerent powers not only during the period mentioned
in the Hague Convention but also three weeks after the expiration
of that time. -Wiring this time he was to use his endeavors to bring
about a peace between the two northern kings upon the foundation of
the treaty agreed upon at P.oeskild. Moreover, during all the nego-
tiations he was to maintain friendly relations with the fleet of
the Dutch. He was further ch^ged to co-operate with the Commander-
in-chief and the Public ministers of the United Provinces in obtain-
ing from the Swedish king a consent to abstain from hostile acts
during the time of treating. (£)
On August 10 the two Snglisja Commissioners, Eoneywood and
Sidney, came to Copenhagen and pressed the King of Denmark and his
Senate for their consent to treat with the King of Sweden and to
the employment of mediators for this purpose. The Danes finally
consented, naming two senators as their commissioners. The King,
(1) Thurloe zt. Papers, vi i , 726 ff.
(2) Ibid., vii. 727-

40.
however, only gave his consent on condition that his letter accept-
ing mediation should he shown to the "ing of Sweden only, that no
oopy of it should he made and in case peace was not secured it
should be returned to hira. ""he Commissioners returned to Slsinore
to the Slag of Sweden to whom they showed the declaration of the
King of Denmark expressing his readiness to treat. "Je vous recois
comme mediateurs, non pas arbitres" was the laconic reply which the
Swedish king then made. He thereupon named two senators to act as
his representatives one of whom was Pielk who had served as an am-
bassador from the Swedish Court to Denmark. He had been ebb de a
prisoner by the Lanes who accused hira of practices ill-tefi t ting
the duties of a public minister and was not yet released from prison.
The King was apprehensive lest the King of Denmark in being
forced into making peace would never keep it. To allay his fears
the Commissioners attempted to demonstrate the weakness of the
Danes, and the readiness of the nediatinr states to mal© good the
treaty. Charles continued in much the same vein as before, addirg
that it was necessary for him to rely on his own strength and not
depend on the assistance of his friends for his security. He
felt that inasmuch as he had gained numerous advantages thru the
prowess of his own sword, it would be great folly to abandon them
and become resigned to a de- endence on others. The Commissioners
prged that since 3ielk was a prisoner, he would hardly propose
anything which ould obstruct the treaty; that the latter v ould
have his freedom in a few days when the article for the general
release of prisoners was drawn up. ^he Commissioners also desired
that, while the letters of safe conducts and other necessary pre-
liminaries were being drawn up, the Swedish King should go over ifc e
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principal points of difference between himself and the Dane. This
Charles refused to do, storraily demanding the immediate release of
Bielk and refusing to discuss the matter further with the mediators.
On \u tTtist 17 the Commissioners retired to Copenhagen where they
attempted to mediate with the "ing of Denmark in securing the re-
lease of Bielk. They wer-^ successful in their efforts and on the
ISth delivered him to Charles.
The Commissioners, shortly after their return, were received
by the Zing of Sweden in a tent fu 1 1 of officers, courtiers, and
servants making it impossible for them "to hold a private interview.
They presented a paper which they declared had been drawn up by
tho ministers of the mediating states. The Swedish Zing thereupon
inquired what i t was and what it contained. The Commissioners re-
plied that it was a project for a treaty which they hoped his Majes-
ty would peruse since it might expedite the much desired treaty of
peace. ^gain, as before, the Swedish T rinr replied, especially for
the benefit of the English Commissioners, that he received them
"comme mediateurs, non pas arbitres" . He declared he would not
receive the project of a treaty, much more he ould treat with no
one save the "ing off Denmark himself. He became excessively wrath-
ful. Turning to the ministers from Holland he declared that he
regarded them as his enemies and wouli under no consideration allow
them to act as mediators. His anger grew more intense and he savage
ly turned away and went to the other side of the room. He soon
after declared that the Commissioners made projects upon their
fleets, but he, laying his hand on his sword, had a project by
his a de. (1) ""he Commissioners were well amazed because by his
(1) As Ranke, ^friglische Ceschichte
,
iv, 240, well says the exact
z ure* t. 'uv e ocas^on are r.o 4" known
«
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endue t nhis majesty shaved, he did not well ran ember, by whose
help bo hath boon maintained all this summer , and enabled to make
his c inquests, which yet would have appeared more strange if we
had not been accu St oned to it n . (1)
The Commissioners held another . 'eet 'ng on August 84* \fter
the usual oivilitiss had passed on both sides in a place midway
betvo^r. the two tents of the Danes and the Swedes, J ho representa-
tives retired to their headquarters. The Swedes desired to move
the place of deliberations to ^Isinore or ^oeskilr1 . This both the
Danes and the Duioh refused to do. In order to obviate a lengthy
and tedious dispute over the changes which both parties desired in
the Treaty of lioeskild , the Danes resolved to agree to them all.
Several other pr o""' sj ons %'ere added which set the time for the
evacuation of the Swedish forces, provision for the declaration
of a generel proclamation of amnesty for the inhabitants of ?orn-
holm who had risen in revolt and slain the entire garrison there
and who otherwise could expect destruction only unless special pro-
vision was made by the treaty. (2)
Hot long after the actual beginning of the mediation the time
of the truce expired end the Dutch fleet at once began to assume
a hostile attitude toward Sweden. The situation at home demanded
the presence of the "English fleet and on the 26th it sailed, leaving
the supremacy of the sea as well as the preponderant influence in
the peace negotiations to the Dutch. The T.ing of Sweden, however,
could not or would not be persuaded to sign a peace unless Kronborg
remained a Swedish possession. All hope to effect a reconciliation
(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vii, ?32
(2) Ibid., vii, 738 ff.
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disappeared , hostilities were once more resumed, and Charles soon
faced a plethora of foes. The Danes, Poles and Austrian8 united
in a concerted attack on the snail Swedish army which was stationed
on the island of Punen and In the battle fought at Uyborg forced
them to surrender (Nov. 14, 1G59 ) lie j or -Ooneral 3otli£er with
2000 men fell in the attack. ""he allies were anxious to prosecute
their victory still farther and attack Zealand, hoping thereby to
end the war immediately. To this the Dutch withheld their consent.
Charles now sought to reconcile himself with his greatest
enemy, the United Provinces, by proposing a partition of the Danish
dominions. He was willing to surrender Trondhjem and Pornholm, but
demanded as a recompense, Agger hus Pehen. He also desired to raze
Kronborg and make traffic thru the Sound free for all. To these
liberal grants, the Holland ambassadors replied that not an inch
of territory should be taken from the Danes, and, though Frederick
himself were willing, they would not permit any territorial read-
justments. (1)
negotiations were once more entered into with the Danes. At
the same time the :wedes prepared to engage in a winter campaign
in Norway. This would entail the levying of fresh subsidies and
Charles was forced to cross over to Sweden to meet his diet which
he had. called to assemble at Gothenburg. Hot long after his
arrival there he was seised with a fever which proved fatal and he
died February 12-13, 1660. (£)
(1) Carlson, op. cit. , 344 ff.
( 2 ) Ibid., 750-353.
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When the news came of the death of Charles, the mediating
powers renewed their efforts to ma^e peace with greater vigor than
ever before. (1) During the first few days in April the Com-
missioners met daily hut they seem to have accomplished little.
Their method of procedure was to go over the "reaty of Roeskild,
examining every point, changing wherever necessary. The Danes
spent a long time disputing the second article of the treaty since
they desired a change which would enable them to contract defensive
alliances. The Swedes, feared that under the cover of defensive
they would contract offensive alliances. They also had a suspicion
that the Smperor, the Xings of Poland and Denmark, the Elector of
Prandenhurg, under the pretense of mutual defense, wero preparing
to form a league against Sweden. Kor this reason they refused to
give their consent to a change in the afor eraent ioned article. The
mediators sided with the Swedes and the Danes 7/ere forced to yield
their demands.
After several days of deliberation the Danes proposed to the
mediators the plan of presenting in to to the terms and conditions
upon which they would make peace. The English mediator, Sidney,
was ready to accept this suggestion since he felt that the pro-
posals of the Danes would have to conform with the stipulations
of the Hague or else they would he regarded as refusants. The
other mediators, however, favored a plan of having each interested
party deliver in writing those changes which they desired in the
mreaty of Roes>ilr<
,
so as to enable the mediating powers to recon-
(1) IJercurius lolitlcus
. Ho. 614, ?r 1211.
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cile the di fferinces between them. The Swedes prep ared a long
formal document containing a number o :" definite changes and addi-
tions which they desired in the Roeskild Treaty. Hone were, how-
ever c^ ntrnry to the spirit of that treaty; but not so with the
Danes, for their numerous exceptions consti tuted a distinct viola-
tion of the treaty, (1)
The two points of dissens'on were the disposition of Bornholm
and recompenses for the losses incurred by the Cuinea Company. In
order to force Sweden to c^me to terms Admiral Ruyter was riven
permission in April to seize nine 'Swedish men-of-war in the Sound.
The Swedes retaliated by placing an embargo on goods and ships
which were at Stockholm, Gothenburg, Abo, and Rival. The French
and JSnglish Commissioners regarded this action of the Dutch as an
unwarranted piece of hostility and felt that they could not 7/ork
wi th the mediator of that country. (2)
In this crisis camo the suggestion of Hannibal Sehested that
the contending parties treat directly rather than thru mediators.
This method was adopted and in a few days treaty negotiations were
entered into. (l«Iay 1660) which proved successful. June 6, 1660
the two pourers signed the Peace of Copenhagen. By its terms Fred-
erick of :.enmark received Trondhjem and ?ornholm, the latter on
condition that he purchase eighteen f reat estates in Scania for the
Swedish Crown. The terms of the Treaty of Roeskild were once more
(1) Thurloe "t. Papers , vii
(2) Carlson, Op. cit., 370-371.
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reaffirmed but the provision which excluded warships from the
Sound was now abandoned. (1)
Sweden emerged from this as the greatest power in the Berth.
She was now at the zenith of her glory. She became one of the
largest states in Europe, possessing a territory more than 16,000
geographical square miles in extent. In addition to this she rank-
ed as the first military power. But there were also innumerable
points of weakness in Sweden's position. Ker population at the
most ibera"1 estimates was scarcely more than 2,500,000 souls, and
was by no means a homogeneous one for in her various territories
were Finns, Slavs, Banes, and Hermans. There was no hope for true
national unity among such divergent peoples with such varying as-
pirations. Only a strong military noxer could hold such anti-ethmo-
graphical units together.
Historians in the past have been wont to condemn the acts of
Sweden's warlike kings as a most suicidal -political policy. In-
stead of deprecating the activities of Charles as having a most
pernicious effect on Sweden, may we not see something salutary in
his policy War is beneficial in this respect that it engenders
loyalty, self-sacrifice, a spirit of duty. It usually brings for-
ward a number of heroic geniuses. In case of Sweden this axiom
v.as especially true. The world has ever been amazed at the galaxy
of statesmen, warriors, heroes, and monarchs who came from the land
of the Uidnight Sun. While the material side of Sweden's great-
ness was sadly neglected, the world of heroes has been nobly en-
r'ched by the career and exploits of such a man as Charles X. His
(1) Carlson, op. ci t .
,
371, 372; Harden, Kistoire Generale des
"Taites de Taix, i, 99.
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life and work makes one almost ready to accept the Carlylian dictum
that history is at bottom the record of the freat men who have 'work-
ed in the world.
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